Measures counteracting 2016 spread of vaccine-derived poliomyelitis virus type 2 in Russian Federation

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  • Authors: Popova A.Y.1, Ezhlova E.B.1, Melnikova A.A.1, Morozova N.S.2, Mikhailova Y.M.2, Ivanova O.E.3,4, Kozlovskaya L.I.3,4, Eremeeva T.P.3, Gmyl A.P.3,4, Korotkova E.A.5, Baykova O.Y.3, Krasota A.Y.3,5, Ivanenko А.V.6, Yarmolskaya M.S.7, Kovalchuk I.V.8, Romanenko E.N.9
  • Affiliations:
    1. Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing (Rospotrebnadzor)
    2. Federal Budget Institution of Health ofRospotrebnadzor“Federal Centre ofHygiene and Epidemiology”
    3. FSBSI Chumakov Federal Scientific Center for Research and Development ofImmune-and- Biological Products of Russian Academy ofSciences
    4. Institute of Translational Medicine and Biotechnology, First Moscow State Medical University, Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation (Sechenov University)
    5. A.N. Belozersky Institute ofPhysical-ChemicalBiology, Lomonosov Moscow State University
    6. Federal Budget Institution ofHealth of Rospotrebnadzor “Centerfor Hygiene and Epidemiology in Moscow”
    7. Federal Budget Institution ofHealth of Rospotrebnadzor“Centerfor Hygiene and Epidemiology in Moscow”
    8. Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing in the Stavropol region
    9. Federal Budget Institution ofHealth of Rospotrebnadzor “Center for Hygiene and Epidemiology in the Stavropol Region”
  • Issue: Vol 10, No 1 (2020)
  • Pages: 90-98
  • Section: ORIGINAL ARTICLES
  • URL: https://iimmun.ru/iimm/article/view/1303
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.15789/2220-7619-MCS-1303

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Abstract

Since April 2016 after global cessation of using trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV) and switch to bivalent OPV consisting of polioviruses types 1 and 3 (the “switch”), any isolation of type 2 poliovirus has been regarded as an event of extreme importance requiring investigation, risk assessment and decision making. In 2016, 2 cases of isolated vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 from healthy children was registered in Russia. Our study was aimed at on the assessing a risk of further spread of vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 and provide measures for preventing its further spread based on epidemiological investigation and genetic characteristics of the isolated viruses. The cases were revealed within the surveillance program for poliomyelitis and acute flaccid paralysis syndrome conducted in the Russian Federation. The laboratory investigation was carried out in accordance with the algorithm adopted in the Russian Federation and recommended by the WHO standards: virus isolation on RD, L20B and Hep2C cell cultures, identification in the neutralization reaction, intratyping differentiation by using RT-PCR in real-time mode, sequencing of the poliovirus genome fragments encoding the VP1 protein. A risk assessment for spread of vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 was performed in accordance with the WHO recommendations. There was uncovered a genetic relationship between virus strains isolated in September and December from unvaccinated Moscow resident boy (1 year old) who arrived from the Chechen Republic and from unvaccinated girl resident of the Chechen Republic (1 year old) with impaired humoral and cellular immunity. The virus strains were found to bear 10 and 13 genomic nucleotide substitutions, respectively, at the site encoding the VP1 protein compared with the Sabin type 2 vaccine strain that allowed to classify them as vaccine-derived polioviruses. In particular, both virus strains were shown to originate from the type 2 strain presented in the tOPV used shortly before the “switch”. Epidemiological investigation revealed family ties and probable contact between both children in the same premises. A series of organizational and vaccination measures was undertaken, as well as polio surveillance was strengthened in the region. No new type 2 polioviruses of vaccine origin were detected in the territory of the Chechen Republic during 18-month monitoring follow-up. The risk assessment of spread for vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 in a region, Russian Federation as well as cross-boundary spread identified it as “low,” requiring no use of type 2 monovalent OPV. Such experience for countermeasures may be taken into account to oppose the risks before and after the global certification for poliomyelitis eradication.

About the authors

A. Yu. Popova

Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing (Rospotrebnadzor)

Email: depart@gsen.ru

PhD, MD (Medicine), Professor, Chief State Sanitary Physician of the Russian Federation, Head.

Moscow

Russian Federation

E. B. Ezhlova

Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing (Rospotrebnadzor)

Email: ezhlova_eb@gsen.ru

PhD (Medicine), Deputy Director, Epidemiological Surveillance Department.

Moscow

Russian Federation

A. A. Melnikova

Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing (Rospotrebnadzor)

Email: Melnikova_AA@gsen.ru

PhD (Medicine), Deputy Director, Epidemiological Surveillance Department.

Moscow

Russian Federation

N. S. Morozova

Federal Budget Institution of Health ofRospotrebnadzor“Federal Centre ofHygiene and Epidemiology”

Email: ovp@fcgie.ru

Head of the Department for Support of Epidemiological Surveillance.

Moscow

Russian Federation

Yu. M. Mikhailova

Federal Budget Institution of Health ofRospotrebnadzor“Federal Centre ofHygiene and Epidemiology”

Email: oki@fcgie.ru

Epidemiologist of the Department for Support of Epidemiological Surveillance.

Moscow

Russian Federation

O. E. Ivanova

FSBSI Chumakov Federal Scientific Center for Research and Development ofImmune-and- Biological Products of Russian Academy ofSciences; Institute of Translational Medicine and Biotechnology, First Moscow State Medical University, Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation (Sechenov University)

Author for correspondence.
Email: ivanova_oe@chumakovs.su
ORCID iD: 0000-0003-1784-4827

Olga Ye. Ivanova - PhD, MD (Medicine), Leading Researcher, Laboratory of Poliomyelitis and Other Enterovirus Infections, Chumakov FSCRDIBP; Professor, Department of Organization and Production Technology of Immunobiological Preparations, Institute of Translational Medicine and Biotechnology, FMSMU named after I.M. Sechenov (Sechenov University).

108819, Moscow, Moskovsky Settlement, Institute of Poliomielitis, home ownership 8, build. 1, Phone: +7 (495) 841-90-54. Fax: +7 (495) 549-67-60, +7 (495) 841-93-21

Russian Federation

L. I. Kozlovskaya

FSBSI Chumakov Federal Scientific Center for Research and Development ofImmune-and- Biological Products of Russian Academy ofSciences; Institute of Translational Medicine and Biotechnology, First Moscow State Medical University, Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation (Sechenov University)

Email: lubov_i_k@mail.ru

PhD (Biology), Leading Researcher, Laboratory of Poliomyelitis and Other Enterovirus Infections, Chumakov FSCRDIBP; Associate Professor, Department of Organization and Production Technology of Immunobiological Preparations, Institute of Translational Medicine and Biotechnology, FMSMU named after I.M. Sechenov (Sechenov University).

Moscow Russian Federation

T. P. Eremeeva

FSBSI Chumakov Federal Scientific Center for Research and Development ofImmune-and- Biological Products of Russian Academy ofSciences

Email: poliom_ldms@mail.ru

PhD (Biology), Leading Researcher, Laboratory of Poliomyelitis and Other Enterovirus Infections, Chumakov FSCRDIBP.

Moscow

Russian Federation

A. P. Gmyl

FSBSI Chumakov Federal Scientific Center for Research and Development ofImmune-and- Biological Products of Russian Academy ofSciences; Institute of Translational Medicine and Biotechnology, First Moscow State Medical University, Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation (Sechenov University)

Email: apgmyl@mail.ru

PhD (Biology), Leading Researcher, Laboratory of Biochemistry, Chumakov FSCRDIBP.

Moscow

Russian Federation

E. A. Korotkova

A.N. Belozersky Institute ofPhysical-ChemicalBiology, Lomonosov Moscow State University

Email: kel@sumail.ru

PhD (Biology), Researcher, A.N. Belozersky Institute of Physical-Chemical Biology, Lomonosov Moscow State University,

Moscow

Russian Federation

O. Yu. Baykova

FSBSI Chumakov Federal Scientific Center for Research and Development ofImmune-and- Biological Products of Russian Academy ofSciences

Email: baykovaaa@mail.ru

Researcher, Laboratory of Poliomyelitis and Other Enterovirus Infections, Chumakov FSCRDIBP.

Moscow

Russian Federation

A. Yu. Krasota

FSBSI Chumakov Federal Scientific Center for Research and Development ofImmune-and- Biological Products of Russian Academy ofSciences; A.N. Belozersky Institute ofPhysical-ChemicalBiology, Lomonosov Moscow State University

Email: krasota@belozersky.msu.ru

PhD (Biology), Senior Researcher, Laboratory of Poliomyelitis and Other Enterovirus Infections, Chumakov FSCRDIBP; Researcher, A.N. Belozersky Institute of Physical-Chemical Biology, Lomonosov MSU.

Moscow

Russian Federation

А. V. Ivanenko

Federal Budget Institution ofHealth of Rospotrebnadzor “Centerfor Hygiene and Epidemiology in Moscow”

Email: fbuz@mossanepid.ru

PhD, MD (Medicine), Professor, Medical Director.

Moscow

Russian Federation

M. S. Yarmolskaya

Federal Budget Institution ofHealth of Rospotrebnadzor“Centerfor Hygiene and Epidemiology in Moscow”

Email: mashay@bk.ru

Head of Virology Department.

Moscow

Russian Federation

I. V. Kovalchuk

Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing in the Stavropol region

Email: Kovalchuk_IV@26.rospotrebnadzor.ru

PhD (Medicine), Deputy Medical Director, Department of Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing in the Stavropol Region,

Stavropol Russian Federation

E. N. Romanenko

Federal Budget Institution ofHealth of Rospotrebnadzor “Center for Hygiene and Epidemiology in the Stavropol Region”

Email: poliost@fbuz26.ru

Head of the Laboratory of Virology.

Stavropol Russian Federation

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Copyright (c) 2020 Popova A.Y., Ezhlova E.B., Melnikova A.A., Morozova N.S., Mikhailova Y.M., Ivanova O.E., Kozlovskaya L.I., Eremeeva T.P., Gmyl A.P., Korotkova E.A., Baykova O.Y., Krasota A.Y., Ivanenko А.V., Yarmolskaya M.S., Kovalchuk I.V., Romanenko E.N.

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